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I. Ed Petrini
Christian & Barton, L.L.P.
{1} Thank you. My name is Ed Petrini of the law firm of Christian Barton. The topic of this last panel of the
conference is Federalism and Beyond: the Uncertain Nature of Federal and State Relationships in a
Restructuring World.
{2} Federalism in the restructuring context has certainly been controversial and filled with uncertainty --
some would say perilous. Some would say the shifts in jurisdiction between federal and state governments
are so serious and of such concern that we should really pause before restructuring the electric industries.
Some say we have not done the right thing in the telecommunications industry either. This area is certainly
filled with potential for competitors and for lawyers. To help us sort it out, we have four distinguished
panelists who are going to identify some of the key state/federal jurisdictional issues in the
telecommunications and electric industries - how those issues are being resolved and how they are likely to
be resolved in the future. And because the telecommunications industry is further along than electricity, we
are going to start with those panelists first.
{3} First up we have Mark Mathis, group president of the mid-Atlantic states for Bell Atlantic. He has been
with Bell Atlantic and its predecessor C&P for more than 20 years. He joined Bell Atlantic as an attorney and
worked his way up to positions of increasing responsibility. Mr. Mathis was also a committee staffer in
Washington, D.C., and prior to that he was with a law firm in Washington, D.C.
{4} Next we have Cary Phillip, Director of State and Regulatory Affairs for Cox Communications, based in
Atlanta. Mr. Phillip was Assistant General Counsel for the California Television Association prior to joining
Cox. Prior to that time he served as Assistant Attorney General doing utility work on behalf of the Attorney
General of the state of Washington.
{5} Ed Brady is Chief Counsel for Regulatory Services for American Electric Power Service Corporation in
Columbus, Ohio. He is responsible for a team of lawyers that represents an American Electric Power (AEP)
system of companies for the various federal and state forums. He's been with AEP in various positions of
responsibility for more than 20 years. Mr. Brady is a member of the AEP's Task Force on Industry
Restructuring. Before joining AEP he was in private practice in Pennsylvania.
{6} Last but not least, we have Tom Nicholson who is currently the Senior Assistant General and Chief of the
Insurance Utility Regulatory Section of the Virginia Attorney General's office. He joined the office about a
year ago. He is a member of the Electric Committee of the National Association of State Consumer
Advocates. Prior to coming to Virginia, Tom was with the Indiana Office of Utility Consumers. He has
extensive experience with both the Federal Regulatory Commission, the FCC, and several other federal
agencies. He was the Deputy Consumer Counsel for Federal Affairs. Prior to that time he was in private
practice in Maine. So with those short introductions I am going to turn it over to Mark. 
 
II. Mark J. Mathis 
Vice President and General Counsel, Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc.
{7} Thank you Ed. Tony Gambredella told me that yesterday Peggy Cummings had some kind things to say
about lawyers. I just wanted to say that in my current job as President of Bell Atlantic I stand before you as a
recovering lawyer. I also saw yesterday that Dick Blackburn was here. It is not reflected in his biographical
material, but Dick started his career with C&P of Virginia, right here in Richmond, and I see that there is
hope for us former telephone company lawyers. Someday we can grow up and become electric lawyers.
{8} I know this morning that we are supposed to be here to talk about Federalism, but I understand that
yesterday one of the panelists had some strong things to say about protecting markets and doing everything
humanly possible to preserve the current situation. When I heard this, frankly I was shocked. I thought he
was describing the New York exchange carriers and what they were doing to protect the long distance market
-- trying to keep us out. So if anyone wants to talk about that today during questions and answers, I would be
happy to do so because we at least think that our friends in the long distance industry are doing everything
possible to keep us out of their markets.
{9} Today we want to talk about federal and state relations and because I know many of you are more
familiar with electric than you are with telephone, I would like to first, provide a little bit of historical
context. In Virginia, I know history is very important and one of my co-panelists went all the way back to the
Civil War and the American Revolution. Since the telephone was not invented until after the Civil War, I am
going to try to keep it to the 20th century.
{10} You probably know your telephone is now totally deregulated, but the line that comes into your house is
used to make both local and long distance calls. The jurisdiction has been divided by Congress between the
State Commission, which regulates the rates for local calls, and the FCC, which regulates calls that go
between states. The precedent for this structure is the Supreme Court Case of Smith v. Illinois Bell, decided in
1930, actually before the famous 1934 Communications Act. What that case said was that when you regulate
the rates you cannot just look at the total cost of the line that comes into your house - you have to separate the
costs between a portion of it being allocated to the state jurisdiction and a portion being allocated to the
interstate jurisdiction-- the state being regulated by the Virginia State Corporation Commission and the
interstate part being regulated by the FCC. When the Communications Act of 1934 was enacted, they had
some express provisions in there. One was to provide a formal procedure for separating the cost between the
states and the FCC. In addition there was a provision of the law, known as Section 2B, which expressly
reserved to the states the authority over all intrastate rates, practices, regulations and such.
{11} Let me fast forward to the 1980's. We had a situation where this line coming into your house was
sometimes used to make local calls subject to the State Corporation Commission (SCC) jurisdiction,
sometimes used to make long distance calls subject to FCC jurisdiction. The costs were allocated between the
two jurisdictions and they set the rates to recover those costs. In the case of the FCC it was done through long
distance rates, in the case of SCC they have lots of things they set rates for. The SCC set rates for call
forwarding, for your basic service, directory assistance and what have you. Until 1984 they even set rates for
Princess telephones and things like that. Let me give you an example of the Princess telephone regulatory
scheme. By the time it was regulated, a portion of the cost was used for both long distance and local calls, a
portion was allocated to the FCC long distance jurisdiction, but there was no interstate rate for the Princess
telephone. All the cost of that phone, which was allocated to the interstate jurisdiction, was recovered through
long distance rates. So every time you called from Richmond to New York, a portion of that charge was to
recover the charge for the Princess telephone. Today, although the telephone itself is no longer regulated, a
portion of the cost of the line is recovered through long distance rates.
{12} Now the FCC decided that among the things they needed to do in regulating this competitive market
was to set depreciation rates for that line into the house. They traditionally had done this through 3-way
meetings and usually the states went along as a result of the 3-way meetings.
{13} But then they decided, because of competition (and this picks up on this morning's discussion) that they
needed to have different ways to figure out our depreciation rates. They considered things like remaining life.
The life of the plant was going to be much shorter because of technological change, and they wanted to have
depreciation rates that conformed to their competition policies. More importantly for purposes of this
discussion, they pre-empted the states and said, "Well, you are free to set rates for intrastate service and
whatever it's going to be for local service in Richmond, but in figuring out what that rate is going to be in a
rate case, you've got to use the depreciation rate we set at the FCC." In doing this they basically said, we want
the states to do what we tell them to with respect to depreciation rates.
{14} The Virginia Commission, among others, could not agree with that. They said, "Wait a minute, Section
2B said we had jurisdiction over all intrastate matters," and the appeal went up to the Fourth Circuit and then
to the U.S. Supreme Court in a case known as Louisiana PFC v. FCC. And in that case the Supreme Court
sided with the states. Frankly, the title of my remarks could be called "Confessions of a Reformed Federalist,"
because in those days we were on the side of the Feds. The Supreme Court told us we were wrong. They told
us we were wrong even though, unlike the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act, which has express
reservations of state authority over depreciation, there is no such provision in the Communications Act.
Because of 2B, the Supreme Court said the state had jurisdiction over all intrastate matters.
{15} Let us fast forward to 1996 when the new Telecommunications Act was passed. Section 2(b) was not
changed in any way. But Congress did say we are going to have competition for local service and we are
going to mandate certain ways of doing this; but the states are going to set the rates. And they basically set
out 3 ways you can enter the local market. You could be a totally facilities-based competitor -- you could
build your own lines, install your own switches and provide service to your customers that way. Or, second,
you could resell the telephone company service. If you do, the state commission is going to set a wholesale
discount and it is going to be whatever the retail rate is minus the avoided costs. So, for example, we would
avoid billing costs, we might avoid marketing costs, and those costs would be used to determine the discount.
Then the third way they said you could enter was to require the telephone companies to unbundle their
network so you could decide as a new entry into the market to install your own switch and use the telephone
company's loops, for example, to provide service. The state commission, again, was given the authority to set
those rates. But the standard was different. There, as opposed to the retail standard, the standard was to set the
rates at cost. If you wanted the phone company's loop, the cost of the loop is the cost of the switch. And this
is a very important distinction in the telephone world because of the way our rates are set -- some rates are set
above cost. Call forwarding for example: we charge a rate way above costs on call forwarding because it is a
discretionary service. The reason it is set above cost is so we can keep basic service below cost and subsidize
those services for rate fares.
{16} I understand some people disagree with me that those rates are below cost, but for these unbundled
network elements that a competitor may use, they have to be set at cost, and the competitor has a choice. Do
you want to use portions of the network and pay costs or do you just want to resell the phone company
service and get a discount from whatever the retail rate is? So, for call forwarding the rate is $3.50 and the
discount in Virginia is 20%. Take 70 cents off and you would be able to get call forwarding at $2.80 and you
would be free to charge whatever you want. On the other hand if you were able to get it for cost it might be
pennies. You have to make a choice here.
{17} After the Act was passed, the FCC decided they had 6 months to adopt rules. Even though Section 2(b)
was still in place, Section 2(b) gives jurisdiction over rates to the state and the FCC decided that they wanted
to promulgate rules that would be binding on the states for setting rates. So, for example, they wanted to
prescribe rules for how to calculate resale discount. They wanted to decide "what is an avoidable cost," and
they had rules for how to determine the cost for these unbundled networks. Most importantly they decided
that they were going to have a way to have even larger discounts than the Telecommunications Act provider.
They wanted to require that our competitors be able to take all of these unbundled network elements, have us
combine them, and instead of paying a wholesale discount, they would be able to pay rates based upon costs.
That is a big difference because if you have something like call forwarding, which is priced way above cost,
and you get to get it at cost (as opposed to 20% off the retail rate), that is a big advantage. The states, some of
the Bell companies and GTE took the FCC to court. It went to the 8th Circuit, and they agreed with the states.
They said the FCC cannot set rules for pricing. They cannot require that we provide to our competitors the
combined network elements, totally eviscerating the requirement of the resale discount. The court basically
said, in Robert Frost's words, "good fences make good neighbors." They said Section 2(b) was a fence that
was hog tight, horse high and bull strong. I guess that means it is a very good fence. Now this is currently
before the U.S. Supreme Court and we are going to find out whether the FCC is right or the states are right.
{18} Let me talk a little bit about the implications of this. The reason Congress has traditionally given this to
the states is because we are talking about local rates. If you look at the differences between Virginia and the
other states, in northern Virginia their business customer cannot get flat rate local calling; whereas in
Richmond a business customer can get flat rate local calling. In Manhattan a residential customer cannot get
flat rate local calling. In New Jersey where you can get flat rate local calling, you cannot call anyone without
making a toll call, because they have very small local calling areas. In Washington, on the other hand, they
have huge local calling areas. The question is, who is going to be the one to decide how you are going to have
local competition. Is it going to be a bunch of people sitting at the FCC trying to make uniform national rules
for Montana, Virginia and Texas? Or is it going to be the people who set the retail rates in the first place? The
people who are closest to where the competition is actually going to happen?
{19} Now the FCC thinks they can do it better in Washington. They want to sit there and say, for example,
that you are going to have a specified number of zones for your local loop rate. But that does not exactly
work. The same rule that would apply to Washington, D.C., which is considered a state, has to also apply in
Virginia or Illinois. And it just does not work because in the case of Washington, how are we going to divide
it? Are you going to have areas like the Rock Creek Park Zone and the White House Zone and that sort of
thing? The FCC just is not in any position to do it. By the same token, you have this very different pattern of
flat rate local calling versus paying by the call that varies all over the lot, from state to state. That is why
Congress, I think, (and we hope the Supreme Court agrees,) fences this off, and gives jurisdiction to the
states. Frankly, maybe some of my colleagues may be able to tell you better than I as to how this applies in
the electric industry. But at least in the phone industry, while we have had situations where certainly the feds
have been the ones who have promulgated. For example, we are going to have competition for telephone sets
and we are going to have competition for local service. I do not know whether that was necessary. The
Virginia General Assembly had repealed the Utilities Facilities Act before the 1996 Act ever came about. We
were going to have competition anyway, but what really is important is that competition is going to work. It's
got to be done under the auspices of the people we think are closest to it.
{20}With that I'll turn it over to the next panel member. 
 
III. Carrington F. Phillip 
Director of State Regulatory Affairs, Cox Communications, Inc.
{21} Good morning. My name is Carrington Phillip, and I am an attorney who has practiced for about 12
years. One of the things that always amazes me, regardless of the topic, is that whenever I appear with a
regional Bell Operating Company, I am always amazed how they manage to get the dig in about the inter-
exchange carriers (ICs). Masterful job!
{22} Having grown up in Canada I think I have seen the best and the worst of federalism. Many of you may
not be aware that until the mid 70's, Canada was a country without a constitution. It basically operated under
the British America Act, , until then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau went to London, England to repatriate the
Constitution of the British America Act into an Amendment becoming Canada's constitution. Before that
event, Canada had a system in place where the federal government absolutely, positively ruled the country.
This is demonstrated by the fact that you could not have a more perfect monopoly than the Canadian
telephone industry. Interestingly enough, subsequent to Canada adopting this constitution, a number of the
provinces then began to demand their provincial rights, which amounted to states rights. I have one
interesting story I wanted to share which illustrates why we need to have a balance between the states and the
federal government in this country.
{23} I remember in the late 70's or early 80's that the Quebec, specifically certain regions of Quebec, insisted
that their local telephone company should not use the RJ-11 Modular Jacks, which many of us enjoyed the
convenience of. Instead they had to use what the French used. It was a 4-5 pin jack you stuck into the wall.
Obviously this might make no sense because the manufacturer argued that the RJ-11 jacks and phones with
modular jacks were prevalent throughout all America and even the Caribbean. What this did was set back the
development of telephony in the province of Quebec.
{24} Here in the U.S. with the advent of competition in local exchange markets, I think we should bear in
mind the lessons which the situation illustrates, and that is that in certain areas it makes sense to have one
regulator, the federal government, at least providing some guidance so you have certain uniform standards
across the nation. This obviously benefits the development in terms of equipment, having standards and
having some expectations for such companies as Cox to enter the various markets. On the other hand, I do
not believe that the FCC and the federal government's role should be dominant or exclusive. I agree with my
colleague that in certain situations the state certainly has a better view of what constitutes a fair price within
its boundaries and what constitutes reasonable regulation based on the unique nature of the state.
{25} In 1996, with the advent of the Telecommunications Act, I believe Congress, (after many years of
listening to lawyers, lobbyists and constituents,) tried to accomplish the job of providing a balanced act that
would hail the advent of competition. I think most commentators would agree that it certainly is not the
perfect act. The Act as a political document suffers from some flaws. Its vagueness was illustrated
particularly in the discussion about whether the FCC or a state commission would have jurisdiction over
deciding rates. Roughly a few months after the Act, very few states actually engaged in the process of trying
to determine appropriate interconnection terms, conditions and rates. Virginia was no among them. So I
believe at that time the FCC, emboldened by the fact that it was not seeing a rush to adjudicate these issues
by the various state commissions, decided to step up to the plate.
{26} I recall reading a quotation from former Chairman Reid Hunt that the Act in his opinion would "toss
traditional interstate authority into the trash can of history." I think that quotation demonstrates why he is the
chairman. But it also indicates that there was a certain thinking at the FCC that it was fully empowered to
step forward and develop national standards. However, despite this thinking, what occurred when the FCC
issued its first reported order and its interconnection rules, it really did not come out and say that these shall
be the rates terms and conditions. What it really established was a set of proxies from which the states could
then make determinations within that range for what would be appropriate rates, terms and conditions. I do
not believe that many of the states have serious disagreements with that. I would certainly argue that based on
the decision of the Virginia Commission, at least with the cost versus interconnection docket, they seem to
appreciate the fact that the FCC had gone through the trouble and analysis of coming up with proxies and
they applied their skill, expertise and knowledge of the local market to developing rates within that proxy
radius. That was the suggestion of Cox. We thought the proxies were certainly adequate and the Commission
could pick within that range. Obviously Bell Atlantic and a number of other incumbents disagreed with that
and U.S. West, in particular, seemed to have concerns over the way the FCC approached setting up its rules.
As a result, we had the appeal to the 8th Circuit, the so-called highway utilities board case. That case
basically requested that the 8th Circuit analyze the Act and make a determination whether the states had full
jurisdiction to determine rates, terms and conditions for interconnection. I think it is apparent that the 8th
Circuit tended to cite the view that the states did have primary jurisdiction; although, that decision, while
certainly helping to clarify things, did issue some additional ambiguities which hopefully will be put to rest
by defending before the Supreme Court.
{27} The 8th Circuit decision also seems to suggest, in fact it is their conclusion, that despite the states
having primary jurisdiction, they need to follow the pricing standards set forth in the Act. So from Cox's
perspective, it is neither a victory nor a defeat. I think we are somewhat grateful for the clarification. We can
certainly argue that in many instances the states would probably have a little monopoly because of their
closeness to the situation
{28} Again from Cox's perspective we have always believed that the balance between the federal and state
jurisdictions is paramount. For example, Cox has a number of operating telephone and cable companies in
California. And it has always been a great concern to Cox that the laws of California and appeals from the
California Public Utilities Commission go directly to the California Supreme Court. That is not necessarily a
bad thing. Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court seems to continually be given the utilities cases and
really does not have the resources to take on utilities cases. To my knowledge they have not handled utilities
cases in 15 years. So ultimately, once the commission makes a decision, that decision is, for all practical
purposes, binding unless you can go on the theory of some type of violation of the federal constitution and
get it into federal court. But the result of that is that ,in California, the relative disparity between the power of
the incumbents and the companies like Cox have given us some pause. We were very comforted by the fact
that the Act suggests strongly that in interconnection matters the federal courts have some jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, here in Virginia, Bell Atlantic and Cox were in dispute over the appropriate characterization of
service traffic, and we went to the Commission. Cox was successful and Bell Atlantic appealed to the
Virginia Supreme Court. I do not mind telling you there were some heated discussions between Cox's local
counsel and corporate counsel as to whether the state had jurisdiction in this matter. We concluded that
although not crystal clear, we do see a role for the state courts in this action. As it turns out that case has been
dismissed. Bell Atlantic has withdrawn the case and it is fortunate that it did not go to the State Supreme
Court despite some reservation by some of the incumbents.
{29} Finally, I wanted to conclude by suggesting that we in the telecommunications industry tend to have
very strong and striking positions on one side of the issue or other. In my view the real issue is not the fact
that the FCC may step up to the plate occasionally and severely overstep its balance. But the real issue is, in
the overall scale of things, does the state commission have a strong role in determining the development of
policy within its borders? In my view, it does in Virginia. I guess from my perspective I see a lot that is
broken. I think that with both the state and the federal government, in the contest that goes back and forth to
determine who has primary jurisdiction, there is a healthy balance and this is absolutely critical to the
development of the competition. Thank you very much.
 
IV. Ed Brady 
Chief Counsel-Regulatory Services, American Electric Power Company
(OPENING REMARKS WERE LOST FOR THIS SPEAKER DUE TO TECHNICAL
DIFFICULTIES.)
{30} First of all federalism is very easy to define. Mr. Phillip talked about Canada. You are talking about the
political science of a delegation of political power from a central government to the state government.
Obviously, that is not our system. It is also used as a magic term that embraces many, many political ideas
and that runs the spectrum. Let me get to what I think are two critical points and these are some of the critical
points you will find in my 2000 articles.
{31} First of all, it is used as a codeword for the shifting of power between the federal government and states,
and over time it has gone from the states to the federal government. Today, we are at the point in the process
where it is going back to the states. This is a critical idea because what you also find is that in our system, our
political leadership is elected independently by both levels of government. That means they have to work
together and you find that in the federal domain, many of our existing federal legislators come from the
states, so there is a residual respect built into our system.
{32} The other thing you will find if you look at these articles, and where we are today, is that there is a
pervasive overlap of state and federal government. We can try to define the bright line in the constitutions that
speak to specific statutes but the reality is that the federal government today is into everything. Most of those
laws are being passed by people who give great lip service to respecting the rules of the states. For example,
if you are talking about crime, taxing, spending money, family care, how we should deal with children, etc.--
the sweep is pervasive. Where does all that take us? Well, the idea is that the legal concept of federalism is a
very lasting one and has changed dramatically over time. What it depends on is the areas examined and the
questionnaires.
{33} I was told that here, some had come from the Civil War, and that many of you do not remember it. But I
do. It was a critical time in our history because there were doubts that really involved states rights in a
centralized government. Unfortunately, the way it came out was that, as Justice Holmes said: "the true
nationhood of the U. S. was forged not in the words of the Constitution but in the blood of the Civil War."
That is a very dramatic statement. You find that problems developed that the states could not handle, and the
federal government stepped in. All of this goes to say that the primary area we are interested in is our
economy and commerce. Now, of course, Newt Gingrich is saying we have to return the power to the states.
President Clinton calls it a contract on America. The critical point is that commerce crosses jurisdictions and
has evolved. We as Americans are so concerned about our national economy that it is virtually in the hands of
the federal government.
{34} Now, we have this conflict that develops (this is an overview, again, from my 2000 articles). You will
find out how we make this division of power. Do we just leave it to the courts? Is it done through the political
process, or is it done through the attitude of the public? The answer is that it is all of those. That is why it is a
great area and a great topic.
{35} Let me talk to you specifically about electric industry restructuring. We are part of the process that is
going on all over the world. Public policy favors competition of free markets and government regulation. The
issue specifically is how do you make it work in a history like ours-- in that you have essentially two ideas?
One, we currently have vertically integrated generating, transmission and distribution companies providing a
single product in a franchised area. What we are talking about is restructuring, and undoing that. We would
be moving those components of a single service into its pieces: generation, transmission and distribution. We
would take the underlying rate, the single rate that consumers look at, and pulling it apart-- taking what we
pay now, the bundle rate, and breaking it into discrete pieces.
{36} Let me show you where that becomes more of an issue. I hate to use numbers, but it will give you a
good sense of this concept. With American Electric Power Service Corporation (AEP) Virginia, generation
and transmission comprise 66% of the company's investment. I can say the same thing for Virginia Power:
65% for generation and transmission. Why is this significant? 15% of their sales are wholesale. The federal
government now provides oversight and rate regulation of that l5%, and the Commonwealth of Virginia and
North Carolina provide oversight for the other 85%. There is the tension. For AEP in Virginia, we sell a little
bit more at wholesale. We have a little more Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) oversight. But
for AEP total, again, 13%, out of the total revenues of the company, are within the federal domain. What is
the significance of that?
{37} As I mentioned before, we are an interstate system. We belong to a grid, and our transmission system
and power plants provide power all over our seven state service territory. Not only do we have that, but we
also have ECOL. This philosophy is that there is a huge break that extends from the Mississippi out to the
Atlantic Ocean, all of it interconnected. What is the point of this? Again, these are only discussion points
because I don't have the answers.
{38} You find that the business activity of the electric utility industry has evolved greatly since regulation
first began in the 1900's. In addition, the character of the business is inescapably multi-state and regional, yet
regulation remains local. That is a very significant point, because restructuring means moving generation and
transmission to the federal domain. All the rhetoric that we are talking about, the importance of federalism,
the idea of state regulation (which I'm not quarreling with), is important, but recognize that what we are
talking about is moving those blocks into the marketplace and under the federal idea.
{39} What else comes from that? Clearly restructuring is a political decision. Some of the questions were
asked yesterday. I just addressed what Judge Miller posed because that is the question I get all of the time.
When our legislators want to know about deregulation, they want to know: are the rates for my residential
customers, the voters, going to go down, and can you guarantee it? The answer to that is no we cannot. It is
not a matter of looking for a slight percentage. Yesterday we had the idea: either you believe in competition
or you do not. The idea of competition is, for all Americans, the hallmark of our society. The question is, how
do you inject it into a regulated industry like ours that has grown up with certain protocols and exists and
operates in a certain way. That is why we have all the questions, and that really gets to the next point: the idea
of conflicts we are seeing.
{40} Let me identify some of the restructuring issues we are going to have to deal with. I mentioned rates.
The idea of no cost subsidization, well, maybe some people think that might be some but the idea is...
(A PORTION OF THIS DISCUSSION WAS LOST DUE TO TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES)
{41} Restructuring is going on in every state. It is being studied, and talked about. Every state is looking at it.
Coincidentally, one of the ideas mentioned earlier today is that if you are a low cost state, you may be
thinking about this slightly differently. Presumably, if you look at where all of the major activity is going, it is
in the high cost states. What is the idea there? Is it to get the structure of the industry correct, or is it to lower
rates? We talked this morning about California and the artificial lowering of rates. What is the end result of
that? As many states continue to move forward there is a slowing of the process. Why is that? Because a lot
of the issues we are identifying are being talked about and there are no easy answers.
{42} What does all that mean? It means that as you dig into these things, you find out that details matter. We
talk about shutting people off in the winter. It is not like getting a busy signal. If you shut someone's home off
in the winter, they die. That's a political issue, you cannot jump over that. Let me tell you something else.
Virginia moved forward a seven sentence bill. This is a great political document because it provides
guidance. It says we do not know what to do, we can give you milestones. It is a great bill, but the details
have to be figured out and we are part of the process. That is one of things I bring up because yesterday
someone said "you really want the political process to sort this thing out, you have got to have rocks in your
head." The answer is no, that is the way we have to do it. If we do not do it that way, I do not know how else
we can do it. I can assure you, because I have litigated a lot of cases, the courts are not the place for this.
{43} Finally, let me conclude with this: "All politics are local." Tip O'Neal said that, and he is absolutely
right. Where does that leave us in terms of this? I have two points. One, competition for electric service is
common, it was launched many years ago. We had Virginia Power start the idea of soliciting generation with
bidding. They identified it in the early 1980's and it has been ongoing for a period of time. We cannot do it
without a federal/state conflict. The question really becomes: when we have that, how do we sort it out?
Everybody has to be sensitive to the other party, and what their viewpoints are.
{44} Two, more critically (and this is something I don't want to take any more time with), we keep passing
laws without thinking of how we are going to administer them. I think that this is one of the critical ideas that
I hope I can leave you with. The important thing is, as part of your recommendation to the General Assembly,
you must ask: how is it going to be administered and how is it going to work. Thank you very much. 
 
V. Thomas B. Nicholson 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General
{45}Unfortunately I'm the last guy standing between you and lunch or you and the door. I am pleased to be
here today. As much of a challenge as it is to be the last speaker of the last panel on the last day, make no
mistake, the last thing state and federal legislators, regulators and other policy makers can afford to do is to
lose sight of the ramifications of their decisions. The issues involved in restructuring the electric utilities
industry should serve as a wake-up call to those of us who are concerned that the interest of the consumer
may become lost in the process. For most of this century, electric power has been supplied to consumers by
monopoly utilities, whose rates, terms and conditions of service are largely provided by a structure
determined by state regulation. Policy makers at the state and federal levels are considering enormous and
wide reaching changes to that structure.
{46} You have already heard the views of some of the other panels, such as the evolving role of state
regulatory commissions in the transition to competitive markets, federal efforts to restructure the electric
utility industry, and lessons we may learn from the natural gas and telecommunications industries. You have
heard about new technology infrastructures and business organizations and, of course, the heavily debated
issue of stranded costs. At the heart of these issue's a recurring theme of cooperative federalism is often heard
and discussed. I would like to put that in context. In May 1995, approximately 2 months after the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) announced its notice of proposed rule making that was to become
Orders 888 and 889, the California Public Utilities Commission issued its proposed policy decision
expressing a policy preference of a majority of city commissioners for the restructuring the industry in
California. Throughout its rule making and investigation, the California Commission became convinced that
the industry's jurisdictional assumptions have "centered on a model of industry that increasingly fails to
mirror reality." In this model, vertically integrated utilities were vested by state governments with exclusive
service territory. The federal government has asserted jurisdiction over the high voltage transmission grid,
pretending that is has become an instrumentality of interstate commerce. They go on to talk about the
introduction of non-utility entrance and a greater quest for economy, which has led to increased incidences of
wholesale transactions. Ed Brady's slide, for instance, showed a 38% wholesale activity for the Appalachian
Power operating subsidiary of American Electric Power (AEP). All of this has created a dependence on the
transmission grid, which has been functionally uniting many of the states, certainly in the west. We are
talking about extending to Canada and Mexico as well.
{47} Now we have the ambition, of many, that retail competition be offered as a variant to, or substitution
for, the traditional arrangement between utilities and end users. As the California commission put it, "this
non-exhaustive list of changes, and calls for change, is fraught with promise as well as peril." According to
the California Commission, the promise is of greater efficiency and enhanced levels of service and reliability.
Former president Fessler, in testifying before the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power, referred to the
peril as this: "I would like to speak to the disturbing possibility that the several states and the federal
government are possessed of an ability to frustrate and to distort the development of market institutions, and,
in the course of that misguided effort, betray the public trust that each of us diligently seeks to advance."
{48} Such a disagreeable outcome is assured if the private sector genius for innovation and reform is
paralleled by a public sector penchant for jurisdictional debates and authority disputation. According to the
California commission, they were determined to avoid that result and its inevitable invitation to thwart
needed reforms with the uncertainty of protracted litigation. Their strategy was, as they put it, to engage their
colleagues on the Federal Energy Commission and other state commissions in a process of cooperative
federalism. Taking that first step, their proposed policy decision outlined what was referred to as a scheme of
shared responsibility in the context of an articulation of our goals on behalf of the California rate payers and
industry participants. In those numerous instances where we acknowledge our authority to be inadequate, we
direct our jurisdictional utilities to initiate proceedings at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, while
providing a clear indication of the steps we will take to follow up on any positive response which they may
provide.
{49} My views are not necessarily those of the office of the Attorney General, so I don't mean to interject too
much controversy here. I must say as a disclaimer, in the words of that great 20th century philosopher Tim the
Tool Man Taylor: "I have no opinion." That being said, while I believe the commission was correct in its
observation that the emerging model of the industry increasingly fails to mirror reality, the more fundamental
issue is whether this new reality will further what I believe to be the purpose of the public utility industry:
reliably served electric customers at reasonable prices, consistent with public interests. The goal should be to
advance consumer interest through effective competition and effective regulation. The focus of the debate
should be the electric consumer, not jurisdiction.
{50} Unfortunately, if our experience following the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is any
indication, former President Fessler's prognostication may be correct in that we may be headed toward
jurisdiction delegates and authority disputation. If that comes to pass in the electric industry, it's going to be
an issue that will preoccupy us for a long time. The introduction of new markets, and new market structures,
create new challenges to both the states and the federal government to assure that both the new regulatory
structures, and the new reality being created for the electric utility industry, are consistent with the public
interest and that regulatory overlaps are minimized and gaps are eliminated.
{51} As I mentioned, the current electric utility structure is largely a creature of state regulatory law. We have
an exclusive franchise and the courts have recognized that exclusive franchises may be said to operate in
restraint of trade or competition in their assigned territory, as a matter of public policy. In accepting a
franchise, the incumbent utility impliedly consents to regulation. As we know from the Supreme Court's 1877
decision in the case of Mont v. Illinois, , when private property is devoted to public use it is subject to public
regulation, because the property is affected with the public interest.
{52} Against this backdrop of state regulatory law, we also have an overlay of federal regulatory law. Most
particularly, I am going to confine my comments to the Federal Power Act of 1935. Section 201B of the Act
tells us that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has jurisdiction over transmission of electric energy
in interstate commerce, and over the sale of energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. Based upon an
analysis of relevant legislative history, case law and the Federal Power Act, FERC has also determined that it
has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates, terms and conditions of unbundled transmission in interstate
commerce by a public utility of electric energy to an end user. What is often glossed over is that, with regard
to Section 201A, the Federal Power Act makes clear that such federal regulation extends only to those
matters which are not subject to regulation by the states. In the words of Bob Dylan, 'the times they are
a'changing' and in the case of federal/state jurisdiction perhaps 'the lines they are a'changing'.
{53} We have already heard about the Clinton Administration proposal, and at last count there were about l0
proposals by House and Senate members to restructure the electric utility industry. I am going to confine my
remarks to the FERC, and, in that regard, Orders 888 and 889 are obviously the landmark decisions of recent
history coming out of that regulatory body. In essence, Orders 888 and 889 require that all utilities that own,
control or operate facilities used for transferring electric energy in interstate commerce, have on file open
access nondiscriminatory transmission tariffs. They also permit utilities to seek recovery of legitimate,
prudent and verifiable stranded costs associated with providing open access under the Federal Power Act and
under Section 211 transmission services. Order 888 defines and identifies the need for a rule requiring open
access transmission as resulting from the discriminatory conduct of existing monopoly providers of bundled
generation and transmission service. The motivation for this conduct is identified specifically According to
FERC, incumbent monopolies, with generation assets whose sum costs materially exceed any reasonable
price for power from alternative suppliers, will use their ownership of transmission facilities to deny
customers access to those lower price generation supply alternatives.
{54} Well, certainly FERC has set the stage for what they perceive to be as their appropriate role in the
restructured electric industry. Ed Brady referred to the fact that in somewhat of a countervailing trend,
authority seems to be investing the federal government with even greater responsibility over the electric
utility industry than they have enjoyed previously. One of the matters they also address in Order 889 is to
articulating a set of principles dealing with independent system operators. There are eleven principles, and
FERC has explained that these are applicable only to independent system operators (ISOs) that would be
control area operators. However, to the extent that an ISO independently controls the operations and planning
of transmission facilities, and the scheduling of power transactions for a regional market, it would provide all
power suppliers some measure of nondiscriminatory equal access to the transmission systems. An ISO's
control of operations would, among other things, produce the potential for manipulation of firm transmission
limits through reported transfer capability and other measures which may also restrict the access of
consumers to sources of generation supply.
(A PORTION OF THIS DISCUSSION WAS LOST DUE TO TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES)
{55}. . . This is a much different focus than what FERC has been talking about. FERC talks about regional
markets. Regional markets are certainly important, but when you talk about what is important for Virginia,
the legislature has indicated these industry structures are to serve the public interest of Virginians. This puts
up a bit of stress or potential strain between states and the federal government. From what I understand that is
not too unusual in the Commonwealth, given its history. As I indicated, not only do we have federal guidance
being offered in the form of ISOs but we also now have direction from our General Assembly requiring that
utilities work together to put together ISOs and renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) that would serve the
public interests of the commonwealth.
{56} As a backdrop, the State Corporation Commission has issued an order establishing investigation, and
requiring reports and actions related to independent system operators, regional power exchange, and retail
access to pilot programs. This is in response to actions taking place before the General Assembly and in
response to comments that it received in its generic docket. It received an incorporated draft working model
for restructuring the electric utility industry in Virginia, which was issued to the Senate in Resolution 259 in
Joint Subcommittee in November of last year. As the staff recognized in that report, an ISO may be the best
way to address bulk power liability issues, promoting effective competition by providing sufficient access to
bulk power transmission facilities through the consolidation of individual transmission systems. Against the
backdrop of the federal and state activity, we also have individual utility efforts to begin to work on these
structures. In December of last year, we had the filing of the FERC by the participants of the Midwest ISO.
Originally this group existed of about 25 utilities covering an extended area, bringing it right to the doorstep
of Virginia through the AEP company. However, things did not go exactly as planned, because in December
another group of utilities announced they were interested in forming an independent transmission entity
known as the Alliance. This group included Virginia Power, Allegheny Power Systems, and other utilities.
The issues that arise there are going to be of fundamental concern, I think, both to regulators and legislators,
as we look at these new market structures, because here in Virginia we have not one ISO proposal but three.
We have the PJM ISO up and running, in which Delmarva is participating. Delmarva has a unique position in
our Commonwealth because it is not, as I understand, directly interconnected with the other Virginia utilities.
{57} So this leaves the remainder of the Commonwealth. What do we do? Well in response to a commission
order coming out of Pennsylvania, we have Allegheny Power (APS)determining that they are going to join
the ISO in the Midwest. This presents an interesting challenge given that, to my understanding, APS is not
electrically interconnected with the midwest ISO. In addition, we have the issue of the AEP, which has joined
unconditionally with the Alliance effort, but is also in the process of trying to reach its hands 'across the
water' to join that group with the Midwest ISO.
{58} Why is this important? It is my view that appropriate size and boundaries for ISOs is critical in terms of
how markets are going to develop. This echoes the comments of Mr. Bevin yesterday, who indicated that the
contour of the grid will largely determine the contour of the market. Issues of ISO topology are going to
confront, not only the individual utilities, but our commission and FERC for some time to come. FERC, in
recognizing this, has also established its own investigation of ISO policies and initiated a series of regional
conferences to be scheduled in late May or early June to address these issues. The important perspective is to
make sure an ISO or odd group of ISOs do, in fact, serve the interests of the Commonwealth. For that our
State Corporation Commission has primary responsibility. Obviously to make sure this is consistent with the
broader regional concerns, the FERC (especially since it will be taking jurisdiction over an ISO) will have
things to say about that as well. In these emerging developments it is very clear that we have the distinct
possibly for significant federal/state conflicts in the future. The question should not to be focused on who has
jurisdiction, but on what is the right answer. Certainly, we need to consider that from a local perspective, but
also a regional perspective. Thank you.
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